Last month, Elad Shamir released a fantastic, extensive post on abusing aid based limited delegation RBCD in Active Directory. One of the large points he discusses is if the TrustedToAuthForDelegation UserAccountControl flag is not set, the S4U2self technique will still work however the ensuing TGS is not FORWARDABLE. This resulting provider ticket will fail for traditional constrained delegation, but will still work in the S4U2proxy manner for aid based restricted delegation. Does the first paragraph sound like Greek?Check out these substances so it makes it bit more sense: Matan Hart’s BlackHat Asia 2017 “Delegate to the Top” talk and…Rubeus is a C Kerberos abuse toolkit that started as a port of @gentilkiwi‘s Kekeo toolset and has endured to adapt since then.
For additional information on Rubeus, take a look at the “From Kekeo to Rubeus” unlock post, the follow up “Rubeus – Now With More Kekeo”, or the currently remodeled Rubeus README. md. I’ve made several recent enhancements to Rubeus, which incorporated me closely revisiting its Kerberoasting implementation. This led to some changes to Rubeus’ Kerberoasting approaches as well as an explanation for some old “weird” behaviors we’ve seen in the sphere. Since Kerberoasting is such a commonly used method, I…For years Microsoft has stated that the forest was the security boundary in Active Directory.
For example, Microsoft’s “What Are Domains and Forests?” document last up-to-date in 2014 has a “Forests as Security Boundaries” part which states emphasis added: Each forest is a single illustration of the listing, the tip level Active Directory container, and a safety boundary for all objects that are located in the forest. This protection boundary defines the scope of authority of the directors. In usual, a safety boundary is defined by the tip level box for which no administrator exterior to the box can take manage away…Every time I think I start to understand Active Directory and Kerberos, a new topic pops up to clutter with my head. A few weeks ago, @elad shamir contacted @tifkin and myself with some ideas about useful resource based Kerberos constrained delegation. Thanks to Elad’s ideas, the good back and forth, and his surprising pull request to Rubeus, we now take into account this attack vector and have a tool to abuse it.
We also now have something @ wald0, @cptjesus, and I have wanted for a long while an ACL based computer object takeover primitive!But first, some heritage on delegation and a dive into its aid based flavor. Delegation…Kekeo, the other big project from Benjamin Delpy after Mimikatz, is a great code base with a set of significant aspects. As Benjamin states, it’s exterior to the Mimikatz codebase as a result of, “I hate to code community associated stuff ; It uses an exterior advertisement ASN. 1 library inside. “ Kekeo adds characteristic list not comprehensive: The skill to request ticket granting tickets TGTs from user hashes rc4 hmac/aes128 cts hmac sha1/aes256 cts hmac sha1 in addition to making use of requested TGTs to the latest logon consultation. This provides a substitute for Mimikatz’ “over pass the hash” that doesn’t manipulate LSASS’ memory and doesn’t require administrative privileges.
The means to request provider tickets from current TGTs. The only S4U…Anyone who has followed myself or my teammates at SpecterOps for ages knows that we’re fairly big fans of PowerShell. I’ve been concerned in offensive PowerShell for roughly 4 years, @mattifestation was the founder of PowerSploit and numerous protecting initiatives, @jaredcatkinson has been writing protective PowerShell for years, and plenty of of my teammates @tifkin , @enigma0x3, rvrsh3ll, @xorrior, @andrewchiles, and others have written numerous safeguard associated PowerShell tasks over the past several years, totaling thousands of lines of code. By now, the reason for choosing PowerShell may be fairly self obvious; the language is Turing complete, built into modern Windows working techniques, and…This is the fifth post in my “PowerView PowerUsage” series, and follows the same Scenario/Solution/Explanation sample as the outdated entries. The common post includes a constantly updated list of all of the series. The Scenario You discovered on an engagement that almost all user workstations include the user’s Active Directory samaccount name, e.
g. John Smith’s device is called something like jsmith computer. domain. local. The Solution The Explanation To begin, we enumerate all user samaccountnames in the atmosphere, using the Properties parameter of Get DomainUser to again “optimize to the left.
” This alerts the…This is the long late follow up to the “An ACE in the Hole: Stealthy Host Persistence via Security Descriptors” presentation slides and video that @tifkin , @enigma0x3, and I gave at DerbyCon last year. This past weekend we gave a talk at @Sp4rkCon titled “The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory” that explored combining our host based protection descriptor research with the work that @ wald0 and I detailed at Black Hat and DEF CON last year on Active Directory defense descriptor backdooring.